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5(c) or APA
AS
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or REVmWING OFFICER IN POST OFFICE FRAUm CASES

The Post Office Department, finding that plaintiff distributor made
misrepresentations in advertising its reducing tablets, issued a fraud order
authorizing the local postmaster to return all mail addressed to it to the
sender, with the word "fraudulent" stamped on the outside. In an action
for an injunction against the local postmaster, the district court upheld the
order on the ground that the misrepresentations were in fact made. The
court of appeals assumed that the district court's decision was right on the
merits, but reversed and entered summary judgment for plaintiff, holding,
in the alternative,' that the Post Office Department's procedure for determining the question of fraud violated the separation of functions provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act.2 Columbia Research Corp. v.
Schaffer, 256 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1958) .
Since 1872 the Postmaster General has been authorized by Congress
to withhold incoming mail from, 4 and forbid the payment of postal money
orders to,5 any person or company using the mails to obtain money fraudulently. The constitutionality of these statutes was early upheld by the
Supreme Court.0 The statutes give no indication, however, as to the procedure to be followed by the Postmaster General in determining whether
mail is fraudulent. When hearings were held as part of the procedure, both
prosecutive and adjudicative functions were performed either by the same
person or by two closely related persons. 7 This practice was subjected to
1. The other ground for reversal was the failure of the Department to publish
the relationship of the Assistant and the General Counsel as a regulation, as required
by § 3(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)
(1952) (hereinafter cited as APA). "However, if, contrary to what appears to us
its very probable purpose, the section does not forbid the powers of the prosecutor
and the judge to interpenetrate . . . , nevertheless, we think that § 1002(a) [requires
us to] hold the order at bar invalid . . . ." Instant case at 679-80.

2. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952). See text accompanying
note 13 infra.
3. On rehearing, the court withdrew its judgment and decided that the action
must be held abated due to plaintiff's noncompliance with FED. R. Civ. P. 9 by failure
to file a timely motion for substitution of a new defendant since the resignation of
Postmaster of the City of New York Schaffer. Instant case at 680-81. See Vibra
Brush Corp. v. Schaffer, 256 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1958).
4. 28 Stat. 964 (1895),'39 U.S.C. §259 (1952).
5. 26 Stat. 466 (1890), 39 U.S.C. §732 (1952).
6. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
7. For an affirmance of this procedure, see Plapao Labs., Inc. v. Farley, 92 F.2d
228, 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 732 (1937). For the history of the use
and denial of hearings by the Post Office Department, see Note, 31 IND. L.J. 257,
258-59 n.9 (1956).
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severe criticism: "without doubt the most acute problem of our administrative system is created by the so-called combination of prosecuting and
adjudicating functions within one agency," 8 and one of the "worst combinations of prosecuting and judging in the federal administrative process
occur [s] in fraud-order cases in the Post Office Department .
. ." 9
Some writers 10 and officials,' in criticizing agency practices generally, went
so far as to recommend a complete separation of the judicial function from
the administrative agency. Others 2 proposed only varying degrees of
insulation of the adjudicative division within each administrative agency.
The objections to the combination of functions in the same or related
persons resulted, in 1946, in section 5(c) of the APA, which provides,
inter alia, that "no officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance
of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any case shall,
in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision,
recommended decision, or agency review . . . ." 13 The manifest purpose of section 5(c), of which the above language is a part, was to effect
the separation of prosecuting and adjudicative functions, in order to promote
fairness to the parties and to stimulate public confidence in administrative
bodies. 14

With several exceptions, the most important of which is the

exemption from its operation of the members of the body comprising the
agency,' 5 it applies to every administrative adjudication in which a hearing
8. Jaffe, The American Administrative Procedure Act, 1956 PuB. L. 218, 225.
9. Davis, Separation of Functions in Administrative Agencies, 61 HARv. L. Rv.
389 (1948).
10. "One wonders, indeed, if the individual can ever be given adequate protection,
human nature being what it is, when the prosecuting and adjudicatory functions are
still subject to the control of the same agency heads."
OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT DAY

VANDERBILT, THE DOCRuNE
SIGNIFICANCE 93 (1953).

11. Minority Opinion of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 203-09 (1941).
12. Among these were the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Administrative Procedure in. Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1941) (hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Committee Report) ; REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S COmMITTEE ON ADMINIsTRATIVE MANAGEMIENT
36-37 (1937) ; and both the Senate and House committees reporting on the bill which
became the APA, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure Act,
Legislative History, 1944-1946, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, 237 (1946)
(hereinafter cited as APA, Legislative History).
13. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1 004(c) (1952).
14. Scanlan, Separati n of Functions in the Administrative Process, 15 GEO.

WAs H. L. REv. 63, 84-85 (1946). The gravity of a fraud-order is readily seen when
one considers the many businesses whose entire operations are based on mail orders.
The denial of incoming mail to such businesses is tantamount to putting them out
of business. Even though the business is not completely dependent on the mails,
potential damage in the loss of public good will, due to the adverse publicity, with the
resulting decline in sales, is a serious matter. These factors come to bear even if
the court of appeals overturns an adverse Department finding, because of the time
involved and the unavoidable connotations of publicity.
15. "This subsection shall not . . . be applicable in any manner to the agency
or any member or members of the body comprising the agency." 60 Stat. 239 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952). In addition to the exemption of the agency itself, the
subsection is also made inapplicable to "applications for initial licenses or to proceedings
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is required by statute 16 or in which a hearing has been required by the
17
Supreme Court in order to save the statute from constitutional invalidity.
The Post Office Department originally denied that the APA applied to it,18
but later confessed error 19 and therewith instituted the system followed at
the time of the instant case. Under that procedure the Assistant General
Counsel of the Fraud Division, one of six operating divisions of the Office
of the General Counsel,20 instituted proceedings by filing a complaint in the
Department when he had reason to believe that the mails were being used
for a fraudulent purpose.2 1 The chief hearing examiner then issued a notice
to the party charged 22 and appointed an impartial hearing examiner qualified under the APA 2a who rendered an initial decision and filed his findings
and conclusions.2 4 Either party could then appeal to the General Counsel,
who was "duly authorized to render the Departmental decision for the
Postmaster General . . . ." 2 The issue presented by the instant case,
the first involving the application of section 5 (c) to the Post Office Department,2 6 is whether the separation of functions under the Post Office proinvolving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or

carriers . . . ." Ibid. It has also been held inapplicable to administrative rule-making
even when sharply contested issues of fact are involved, and even when such rulemaking has immediate and grave economic import to the party concerned. Willapoint
Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 692-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949). There are several other minor exceptions set forth in § 5 of the act.
16. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952). Noncompliance may be
waived by the party concerned by lack of timely objection if such nonaction is voluntary
and without coercion. Democrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F2d 298, 305 (D.C.
Cir. 1952).
17. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
18. Since the postal statutes did not expressly require a hearing, the Department
contended that its proceedings were not subject to the APA. This position was
affirmed in Bersoff v. Donaldson, 174 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions on the Immigration Service, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950), and the Interstate Commerce Commission, Riss & Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 907 (1951), reversing per curiam 96 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Mo. 1950), destroyed the foundation of this argument. For the history of the APA and the Post

Office Department, see Cutler, The Post Office Department and the Administrative

ProcedureAct, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 72, 76-78 (1952).
19. See Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804, reversing per curiam 189 F.2d 369
(7th Cir. 1951).

20. Letter From Herbert B. Warburton, General Counsel, Post Office Depart-

ment, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Dec. 9, 1958, on file in Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
21. 39 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1955). Assistant General Counsel had been substituted
for Assistant Solicitor and General Counsel had been substituted for Solicitor, but
the procedure remained the same. Instant case at 679. Most of the cases which reach
the fraud division come from postal inspectors. Occasionally, public complaints are
the source. Letter From Herbert B. Warburton, supra note 20.
22. 39 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1955).
23. 39 C.F.R. § 201.14 (1955).
24. 39 C.F.R. §20123 (1955).
25. 39 C.F.R. § 201.24(h) (1955).
26. But see Pinkus v. Reilly, 157 F. Supp. 548, 552 (D.N.J. 1957), which seriously questioned the propriety of the Department's procedure but found it unnecessary
to pursue the point. A procedure of the Social Security Administration in which the
agency referee acted as both advocate and judge has been held to be noncomplying
since such a procedure is precisely that which the APA forbids. Wilson v. Folsom,
151 F. Supp. 195 (D.N.D. 1957).
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cedure described above is sufficiently complete to comply with section
5(c) of the APA.
The objection to this procedure centers around the fact that the Assistant General Counsel, who acts as prosecutor, is a subordinate of the
General Counsel, who acts as reviewing judge. Although the court was
able to dispose of the case by finding that there was no published regulation,
as required by section 3(a) of the APA, describing what authority the
General Counsel has over the Assistant General Counsel, 7 it expressed
great doubt that any regulation could be so drafted as to avoid the "combination" objection if the Assistant remains a subordinate of the General
Counsel.2 8 Whether or not the General Counsel directly supervises prose-

cutions, the possibility of prejudice is present. Initially, it may be observed
that the General Counsel is, as a practical matter, ultimately responsible for
Department prosecutions,29 and thus it is to be expected that in the performance of his review functions his frame of mind may result in unconscious
prejudice against alleged violators. Moreover, in addition to passing on the
merits of cases prosecuted by the Assistant, the General Counsel both
selects the Assistant and is responsible for his future promotions.8 0 These
facts may lead the Assistant, even though unconsciously, to select some cases
that cater to the prejudices of his superior that otherwise might never have
been prosecuted and, on the other hand, to eliminate other cases because
he feels that his superior would not favor them although the Assistant himself feels certain that they involve violations that should be prosecuted.81
The General Counsel thus is in a position to select, although indirectly, the
cases to be prosecuted. Similarly, the desire to please his superior may
affect the Assistant's presentation of the case. Finally, because of the fact
that the General Counsel has himself selected the Assistant, he may be disposed to rely to some extent on the Assistant's judgment rather than solely
upon the record.
Admittedly, most of the objections to former Post Office procedures
have been eliminated by the utilization of independent hearing examiners.8 2
27. See note 1 supra.
28. Instant case at 680. In reference to Glanzman v. Schaffer, 143 F. Supp. 243
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 252 F2d 333 (2d Cir.), vacated, 357 U.S. 347 (1958), which
sustained the Post Office procedure, the court said, "[I]t did not . . . give any
reasons for this conclusion, and neither in the notice of appeal nor in the briefs on
appeal was the question raised or discussed." Instant case at 680.
29. Letter From Herbert B. Warburton, sura note 20.
30. Ibid.
31. This danger was pointed out by the instant court: "[it appears to us reasonable to suppose that the prosecutor will be disposed to select such cases as he believes
will meet with his superior's approval, and that his discretion may be exercised otherwise than if each was responsible to the Postmaster only by a separate chain of
authority." Instant case at 679. The court also states that if the procedure in the
instant case were reversed, i.e., if the General Counsel prosecuted and the Assistant
made the final decision, it would plainly be contrary to the purpose of the subsection
because "the subordinate would then be passing upon the success of what his superior
had undertaken." Ibid.
32. See text accompanying note 23 sura.
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Moreover, since it has been noted that the findings at the initial hearings
are generally "rubber-stamped" by the reviewing authorities in the Post
Office Department,33 it might be urged that there is little need for concern
about the connection between the prosecutor and the official who makes the
final agency decision. However, much doubt has been cast on the inde34
Nor is it proper
pendence of the hearing examiner in actual practice.
authority
reviewing
and
prosecutor
between
to justify a close relationship
reviewing
independent
the
fully
to
perform
failure
latter's
on the basis of the
function assigned him. In any event, the foregoing arguments at best
can be taken to mean only that whatever danger remains is slight. Elimination of the remaining danger, however, is possible with relatively slight
cost to the agency here involved. This has in fact been accomplished, subsequent to the time at which the instant case arose, by establishing in the
Office of the Postmaster General an independent judicial officer to whom
5
This
appeals from the decisions of the hearing examiners are taken.
judicial officer is appointed by the Postmaster General and is subject to
civil service.3 Far from impeding the administrative process, the handling
of fraud and obscenity cases has apparently been accelerated by the institution of this change.3 7 Balancing the possibility of prejudice to the individual against the cost to the agency in the instant case, the removal of
even the relatively remote connection between prosecutor and judge here
present seems desirable, and an agency faced with any situation involving a
similar balance should of its own accord, as did the Post Office Department,
take whatever steps are necessary to remove the possibility of influence.
Whether the APA requires that the Post Office take such steps is a
more difficult question. The only language susceptible of interpretation as
prohibiting the superior/subordinate relationship between General Counsel
and Assistant is that clause which provides that "no officer, employee, or
agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions
for any agency in any case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency re,"38 Whether this clause can be so interpreted is dependent
view .
upon whether or not the General Counsel can legitimately be viewed as
engaging in prosecuting functions. In the sense that he is officially in charge
of departmental prosecutions, he does so engage. An examination of the
legislative history of the clause, however, leads to the conclusion that it was
33. 100 U. PA. L. Rav. 261, 262 n.11 (1951).

See also Note, 66

HARv.

L.

REv.

1065, 1067 (1953) ("more and more weight has been given the trial examiner's
findings on the assumption that he has become independent of agency control").
34. Davis, upra note 9, at 394-95; Note, 66 HAIv. L. Rrv. 1065, 1075 (1953).
Apparently this judicial officer has on occasion
35. 23 Fed. Reg. 2817 (1958).

been utilized in the role of hearing examiner. Such utilization has, however, been
held to violate the APA. Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v. Christenberry, 27 U.S.L.
W=mK 2360 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1959).

36. Letter From Herbert B. Warburton, supra note 20.
37. Ibid.

38. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
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directed toward a different evil.3 9 The basic purpose of the quoted clause
was to remove from the decision the influence of the prosecutor, who
because of his role as investigator is likely to base a decision upon facts and
information discovered ex parte, not subject to cross-examination and
rebuttal in open hearing, and because of his role as advocate cannot bring
to the decision an unbiased state of mind
The influence sought to be
removed was that of the prosecutor on the judge; there is no indication that
the provision was designed to remove the influence of the judge on the
prosecutor. Moreover, the General Counsel, in the average case at least,
does not acquire those prejudices characteristic of one actively engaged in
prosecuting. 41 Also relevant is the limitation of the prohibition to persons
engaging in "that [case] or a factually related case," - which suggests that
something more than indirect engagement in the case under consideration
is required in order to render the prohibition operative. The question
arises, however, whether the connection present in the instant case is of the
nature of the practices intended to be proscribed by the act, and thus violative of the policy embodied therein. An affirmative answer to this question
may provide justification for interpreting the above clause to prohibit the
connection. In making this inquiry, it may be observed initially that the
basic policy underlying the revision of adjudicative procedures in governmental agencies was the promotion and insurance of fairness to the parties.48
At the same time, Congress sought to preserve the efficiency inherent in the
administrative process by permitting the agencies to retain the requisite
flexibility in designing procedures fitted to their particular needs."4 On
a narrower plane, several aspects of the legislative history of the act bear
upon the question of the permissibility of the superior/subordinate relationship. The history of the clause considered above is again relevant as
indicative of the dangers of prosecutive bias with which the drafters were
concerned. Of perhaps greater importance is the history of the clause
exempting the agency, or members of the body comprising the agency, from
the operation of section 5(c), 45 since it is through the deliberations upon
this exemption that the views of the drafters on the existence and permissibility of bias at the review stage are best revealed. The justification for
granting the agency exemption-even though by so doing the combination
of the investigative, prosecutive, and adjudicative functions in a single
person was made permissible-was twofold. On the one hand, the danger
39. For a discussion of the Post Office Department's procedures, but concerning
only the function of the hearing officer and of the scope of judicial review, see Hearings
on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on

the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-69 (1941).
40. Attorney General's Committee Report; APA, Legislative History 24-25, 203.
41. Compare text accompanying notes 29-31 supra with text accompanying note
40 supra.
42. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
43. Scanlan, supra note 14.
44. Attorney General's Committee Report 214; APA, Legislative History 250.
45. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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of prejudice was viewed as relatively slight; "the sheer volume of work
does not permit the agency heads to participate actively in developing one
but requires that they reserve themselves for the task of

side . .

deciding questions presented to them by others." 4' The possibility of
some bias admittedly remained. There appears, however, to have been
little concern about the potential dangers of the superior/subordinate relationship.47 On the other hand, the "disadvantages of sheer multiplication
of separate governmental organizations" 48 together with the resulting lack
of consistency of action, uncertainty, and breakdown of responsibility, were
considered too great to justify or require complete separation.49 One final
aspect of the history is the fact that it was contemplated that in the Post
Office and other agencies headed by a single individual the review function
would, and should, be delegated.O Added to this is the indication that the
complete separation of prosecutive and reviewing functions presented, in
the drafter's view, serious disadvantages, impairing, for example, negotiations and informal settlements--"the lifeblood of the administrative
process." 51

From the foregoing examination conflicting conclusions may be drawn.
It may be argued that the dangers of prejudice at the agency level were
viewed as slight primarily because the broad scope and "sheer volume of
work [do] not permit the agency heads to participate actively in developing
one side," r2 and that the remaining dangers were permitted to exist only
because the costs of complete separation were too great. The argument
continues that the dangers presented by the superior/subordinate combination increase when the review function is delegated below the agency level
both because the scope of the delegate's job is likely to be narrowed, and
because his closeness to the prosecutor is increased. At the same time the
costs of complete separation at the lower level, at least in the Post Office,
are relatively slight. Moreover, the mere fact that delegation was contemplated does not compel the conclusion that a combination of functions is also
delegable: the agency exemption clause clearly cannot be applied to the
General Counsel. While these arguments are persuasive, those leading
to an opposite conclusion appear equally so. Although the agency exemption cannot be applied to the General Counsel, the contemplation of delegation and the disadvantages of separation may justify interpretation of
section 5 (c)to permit the relatively slight danger of the remote combination of functions here involved. Moreover, the absence of expressed
46. Attorney General's Committee Report 57.
47. See ibid. Nor did the report of the minority, recommending complete separation, evince concern about this danger. Id. at 203-09.
48. Id. at 57.
49. See Attorney General's Committee Report 57-60; cf. APA, Legislative History
204, 262.
50. Attorney General's Committee Report 53, 150.
51. Id. at 59-60.
52. Id. at 57.
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concern about the existence of the superior/subordinate relationship may
well indicate that the dangers flowing from this relationship were considered too insignificant to require interference with existing agency procedures, even absent a cost consideration. Finally, the act as a whole may
53
be viewed as an attempt to prescribe only minimal standards of fairness,
removing only the major dangers of prejudice rather than every danger.
Argument based on the intent of Congress, in the broad sense, will
thus serve both sides. Whether a court is justified in reading into the
ambiguous provisions of a statute a requirement such as the one here contemplated is a matter more of philosophical approach than of legal analysis.
It depends, ultimately, upon the court's conception of its own role as the
means by which the legislative will is effectuated in particular instances. If
the court deems it its function to deal with the ultimate legislative ambiguity
by resolving the issue on its substantive merits, it will, when presented with
a question of this type, decide on the basis of policy considerations of its
own choice. If, however, it defines the scope of judicial competence as one
which stops the court from acting at the outer limits of the ambiguity, it
will conclude that in such a case judicial wisdom requires the exercise of
judicial restraint. 4

CIVIL PROCEDURE-ExRATE

m r oiAL SERVICE PROVISIONS

s ACT HELD INAPPLICABLE TO CoMo-LAw ACTION
OF SECUmR
FOR RESCISSION JOINED WITH SECURITIES ACT ALLEGATIOI

Plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, instituted suit in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking rescission,
under the Securities Act of 1933,1 of an allegedly unlawful sale of stock
made in Pennsylvania by defendants, citizens of New York. Defendants
were served in New York pursuant to section 77v(a) 2 of that act, which
permits service of process extraterritorially wherever defendant may be
found. As the result of new matter disclosed during the taking of depositions,3 plaintiff filed an amended complaint including an allegation of
mutual mistake and seeking rescission under state common law. Service
53. JAFFE, ADmmNIsTRATrIv LAw-CASES AND MATERIALS 110 (1954); APA,
Legislative History 193, 250.
54. For conflicting views on the role of the courts in this situation, compare
Simpson, Robert H. Jackson and the Doctrine of Judicial Restraint, 3 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 325, 346-48 (1956), and Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 CoLum. L. Rzv. 527 (1947), with Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L.
REv. 863 (1930). For an exposition of Judge Hand's own views, see Lancaster,
Judge Learned Hand and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 9 VAND. L. Rav. 427
(1956).
1. 48 Stat 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1952).
2. 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
3. Plaintiff's Brief Contra Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of
Amended Complaint, p. 2.
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of the amended complaint was had upon defendants' attorney in Pennsyl4
vania, pursuant to rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that service of the amended complaint, not having been made upon defendants personally in Pennsylvania,
was not in accordance with Federal Rule 4(f) requiring service of process
within the state in which the court sits unless otherwise authorized by
federal statute. The court held that, since the state action set forth in
the amended complaint did not arise under the Securities Act, the extraterritorial service provisions of that act were inapplicable, and service of
process must be had within the state in which the district court sits. The
court also held that rule 5 does not apply unless the amended complaint
could have properly been served originally by the method used in serving
the complaint which it amends.6 Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851
(E.D. Pa. 1958).
An action under the Securities Act of 1933 may properly be brought
in any district in which "the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place.
"0 To supplement this liberal venue provision, the act makes possible the service of process extraterritorially "in any other district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." 7
Thus, under the facts of the instant case, it is clear that as to plaintiff's
claim under the Securities Act venue was properly laid and service of
process effective. It is also clear that the instant court had jurisdiction on
grounds of diversity of citizenship over the subject matter of plaintiff's
action for rescission based upon mutual mistake. Venue as to that action
would also be properly laid in the instant court.8 Viewing that action
separately, however, service of process could not be had extraterritorially
but would be limited by rule 4(f) to Pennsylvania, the state in which the
district court sits. The question presented by the instant case is whether
4. Fun. R. Civ. P. 5(a) provides, in pertinent part: "[E]very pleading subsequent to the original complaint . . . shall be served upon each of the parties
affected thereby. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. ... "
5. The court also ruled that the provisions of FE. R. Civ. P. 5, permitting service of an amended complaint upon the attorney of record, did not dispense with the
requirement of personal service within the jurisdiction in the instant situation. The
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, treating it as a motion to set aside and
vacate service of the amended complaint, with leave granted to defendants to renew
the motion to dismiss if proper service has not been made within one year of the
filing of the amended complaint. Instant case at 853.
6. Securities Act of 1933, §22(a), 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a) (Supp. V, 1958).

7. Ibid.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1952).
9. FE. R. Civ. P. 4(f) provides that: "All process . . . may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held and,
when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of
that state."
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that limitation must be applied to the state-law claim when that claim is
joined with an action under the Securities Act.' 0 Relaxation of the limitation would seem permissible by analogy to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction ". as set forth in the case of Humn v. Oursler.'2 In that case, the
Supreme Court held that a district court, having jurisdiction over a federal
claim because of the existence of a substantial federal question, may dispose of the case upon a non-federal claim if the two are but "different
grounds asserted in support of the same cause of action." 13 In Hurn there
was no diversity of citizenship between the parties and personal service
had been had on defendant in the state in which the court sat. Therefore,
the question was whether the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the non-federal claim. The requirement that the federal and state
claims be but different grounds of recovery for the same cause of action
has been subject to varying interpretation by the several circuits. In Hurn
the Court pointed out that the state and federal claims rested upon identical
facts. The Second Circuit has extended the application of the doctrine
only slightly to situations where the claims rest upon facts which are substantially identical. 14 Other circuits have given the test less stringent application 15 and the Ninth Circuit has allowed joinder of a state claim of
fraud in the sale of land with a federal claim under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,16 relying on the presence of a "single fraudulent scheme." 17
The instant court viewed the Hurn doctrine as applying only to jurisdiction. Yet it would seem apparent that if the considerations underlying
that doctrine are sufficient to overcome the constitutional objection of lack
of jurisdiction, they are at least equally sufficient to justify a liberal interpretation of the statutory service requirements as set forth in rule 4(f).
10. It is apparent that had Congress so desired it could have validly authorized
service of process of any federal district court to run anywhere within the territorial
limits of the United States. United States v. Union Pac. MR., 98 U.S. 569 (1878).
It has seen fit to do so only as to certain statutes. See, e.g., Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, § 25, 49 Stat. 835 (1935), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1952).
11. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction first appeared in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824), where the Court held that a federal
court may decide state-law issues when necessary to the decision of a federal question, because the constitutional power to decide a "case" must include the power to
decide all issues necessary to a decision. In Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S.
175 (1909), this concept was extended to permit a federal court to adjudicate
state-law issues which were unnecessary to the decision of a federal claim in order
to avoid a federal constitutional question.
12. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
13. 289 U.S. at 247.
14. Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
738 (1944); Treasure Imports, Inc. v. Henry Amdur & Sons, Inc., 127 F.2d 3 (2d
Cir. 1942); Note, 52 YALE L.J. 922 (1943). In Zalkind v. Scheinman, supra, Judge
Clark dissented, espousing the more liberal view that the consideration of judicial
economy should be adequate to justify the extension of the Hum doctrine to cover
situations where there was a common central matter basic to both claims.
15. See, e.g., Manosky v. Bethlehem-Hingham Shipyard, Inc., 177 F.2d 529
(1st Cir. 1949); Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427 (lst Cir. 1949); United Lens
Corp. v. Doray Lamp Co., 93 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1937).
16. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-jj (1952).
17. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1956).
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In the situation presented by the instant case, if extraterritorial service
as to both claims is not allowed, plaintiff, desiring to bring his fraud action
in a district proper under the Securities Act, must forego litigation of his
ancillary state-law claim in the same suit unless defendant can be personally
served within that district. If plaintiff chooses to bring the Securities
Act action separately, he may be permitted, should he lose, to bring a second suit in defendant's district, where proper service may be had.' 8 The
nature of the dispute in question, however, seems to require that it be
adjudicated in a single suit. The allegations of fraud and of mutual mistake are but alternative versions of the same transaction. Adjudication in
separate suits thus seems undesirable from the standpoint of judicial
economy. Moreover, proof of one theory disproves the other. 19 Thus,
even though it may be clear that plaintiff should recover on one theory or
the other, the bringing of separate suits may result in an ultimate judgment for defendant because of disagreement on the part of the individual
courts or juries as to which theory of recovery is proper. Plaintiff, of
course, can avoid these problems by bringing the combined action in the
district where defendant resides. But in so doing he must forego the
liberal venue provisions of the Securities Act, which are indicative of the
congressional view that at least some securities actions might be better
brought in a district other than that of defendant's residence. For example, the availability of proof might make the district where the transaction
occurred, as in the instant case, a particularly appropriate forum.
Balanced against the foregoing considerations are the arguments
against a relaxation of the service requirements to permit extraterritorial
service of the joint complaint in the instant situation. The limitation of
service of process to the state in which the district court sits is in part
analogous to defendant's venue rights; he is protected from the inconvenience of being forced to defend a suit in a foreign jurisdiction. It is
apparent that this argument has little merit here, however, since defendant
can be compelled to litigate in Pennsylvania the very same transaction,
under the Securities Act allegation of fraud as to which venue and
service are proper 2
The danger exists that plaintiff could present a
18. If plaintiff voluntarily brings two suits he runs the risk that after judg-

ment for defendant in one suit, the court having jurisdiction of the second suit will
determine that both claims could and should have been asserted in the prior action
and therefore the first judgment is res judicata to the maintenance of the second
Suit. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 63 (1942). On the other hand, if plaintiff attempts
to bring both claims together and the court determines that jurisdiction of one is

lacking, a second suit should not be barred.

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

§ 67 (1942).

19. Section 12 of the Securities Act, 48 Stat 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (1952), provides: "Any person who [misrepresents a material fact in the sale
of a security] and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him. .. "
Thus, the affirmative defense of mistake, if proven, will completely absolve the seller
from liability under this section.

20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952) providing for change of venue for the con-

venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, to any other district where
the action might have been brought-the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
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state-law claim and, in bad faith, join with it a federal statutory claim
solely in order to utilize the extraterritorial service provision of the federal
statute. The application of the Hum doctrine, however, presupposes the
existence of a substantial federal claim. Under that doctrine, defendant is
free to contest jurisdiction if it becomes apparent during pre-trial, or the
early stages of trial, that the federal claim is not substantial or that the
two claims rest upon dissimilar facts. 21 So too could defendant move to
quash service if bad faith or dissimilarity of facts appears. Under a system
in which discovery and pre-trial are readily available, the problem of bad
faith joinder does not appear insurmountable. It may be argued further
that, since the federal district courts sit as the alter-ego of the state courts
in cases in which jurisdiction is founded solely upon diversity of citizenship, restriction of the process of a state court to those physically within
its borders 22 should be applied with equal force to the federal district
courts. Theoretically this may be true, but in Hurn-type cases jurisdiction
does not rest upon the state-law claim, as to which diversity is lacking,
but rather upon the presence of a substantial federal question; jurisdiction
of the federal claim carries with it jurisdiction of the state-law claim when
that claim is but "different grounds asserted in support of the same cause
of action." 23 The same rationale may be applied to this analogous situation in order that a federal court, properly chosen by the plaintiff to hear
his federal claim, may adjudicate ancillary claims.24 This result is consistent with the congressional policy that liberal venue provisions should
apply to cases arising under and concerning the Securities Act. On
21. Cf. Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).
22. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 247 (1933).
24. The instant court said that the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine applies only to
questions of jurisdiction and not to service of process, citing as authority Pearce v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 162 F2d 524 (3d Cir. 1947). That case involved a claim of
negligence against the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 39 Stat.
742 (1916), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§751-93 (1952), and against an individual on
state common-law grounds, diversity of citizenship being lacking. The court dismissed
the state-law claim for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that it stated not an ancillary cause
of action but a separate and distinct cause of action. The decision was based upon a
dissimilarity of issues between the parties due to differences in measure of liability
under state and federal law. The instant court also relied upon Moreno v. United
States, 120 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1941), in which suit was brought against the United
States in a federal district court in Massachusetts to recover the proceeds of a policy
of war risk insurance. The Government interpleaded the named beneficiary as third
party defendant and obtained extraterritorial service of process in New Jersey as
authorized by the World War Veteran's Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 612, as amended, 38
U.S.C. §445 (1952). Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint asserting a state-law
claim against the third party defendant for alienation of affections. The district court
denied leave to amend. The First Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had
jurisdiction over the third party defendant for the limited purpose of determining who
was entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy. As such, her appearance did not
constitute a waiver or estop her to assert that in a suit against the United States under
the statute she could be summoned in as a third party defendant only for the purpose
of determining whether she was entitled to the proceeds of the policy. It is clear that
the Moreno case is not controlling here, as the introduction of the third party complaint in that case would have involved substantially different proof upon each claim.
In the instant case, the two claims are based on the same transaction. See text
following note 18 supra.
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balance, the desirability of permitting the disposition of the entire cause
of action in a single suit seems to outweigh the foregoing objections to
extending jurisdiction in the instant case. A liberal interpretation of rule 5
to permit service as here made, and the application to this situation of the
Humn doctrine, thus seem preferable to the position taken by the instant
court of isolating each claim and, on the pleadings, without consideration
of the particular facts, requiring separate service of process. 25

CORPORATION

LAW-Co-wlON

oF

PREFERRED

STOCK

CALLED FOR REDEMPTION TO COMMON OF EQTIVAIENT VALuTE NOT
A "PuRBCosniS"
WITHIN SECTIoN 16(a) oF THE SECURmES ExCHANGE ACT
In 1948 defendant acquired a number of shares of convertible preferred
stock of Ashland Oil and at that time became a director of the corporation.
These preferred shares were convertible at any time before July 1958 into
Ashland common stock on a share-for-share basis. Their convertibility was
protected against dilution by automatic adjustment of the conversion ratio
to offset proportionately any change in the number of common shares outstanding. Both Ashland common and Ashland preferred were registered
securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, where, because of the
secured convertibility of the preferred, they tended to sell at equivalent
prices. The preferred stock was subject to call for redemption at a fixed
rate upon thirty days notice, but during the thirty days the conversion
privilege remained available. In 1951, at a time when Ashland preferred
was selling on the market for $36 a share, the corporation called all of the
outstanding preferred stock for redemption at $27, expecting and intending
that all holders would exercise their conversion privileges. Defendant
converted, and then, within six months of conversion, sold a block of the
common stock thus acquired at prices in excess of the price of common
on the conversion date. Upon demand of a stockholder, the corporation
brought action against defendant under section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act for recovery of profits realized by a corporate director's
25. In spite of the court's holding, it is conceivable that a plaintiff in the instant
situation may be able to obtain service even though defendant does not voluntarily
enter the jurisdiction. Subject to a showing of hardship under FED. R. Crv. P. 30(b),
a party defendant may be required to come into the district for purposes of giving
oral deposition. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a). O'Neill v. Blue Comet Cab Corp., 19 F.R.S.
525 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Although defendant, while in the district to give his deposition,
is generally immune from service of process in another suit, it does not necessarily
follow that he is immune from service of process in connection with the same suit.
The immunity granted rests in part upon a desire to encourage compliance with court
orders without fear of harassment by way of a second suit. But it is said to be a
privilege of the court rather than of the individual and should not be extended
beyond the reason upon which it is based. Accordingly, it has been held that where
the attempted service of process pertains to the same suit precipitating the individual's
appearance in the district, no immunity attaches. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222
(1932); Roth v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Ferguson
v. Ford Motor Co., 92 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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short-swing "purchase and sale" of equity securities of his own corporation.
Judgment for defendant was affirmed on appeal; exercise of the conversion
privilege did not constitute a "purchase" within the meaning of the act.
Ferraiolov. Newmuan, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 27 U.S.L.
WEEK 3244 (U.S. March 2, 1959).
Intended to deter the speculative stock manipulations of those whose
access to confidential intra-corporate information might give them an
inequitable market advantage, section 16(b) of the SEA' requires corporate insiders to disgorge for the corporation's benefit all profits realized
2
upon short-term in-and-out trading in stock of their own companies.
"Prophylactic" 3 rather than punitive or compensatory, the section eschews
all tests of manipulative intent or actual misuse of inside information in the
individual case 4 and defines by arbitrary and objective rules of thumb the
transactions to which it applies.3 Upon a showing that the contested deal1. "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer ["every person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class
of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered on a
national securities exchange, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such
security"] by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
(other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for
a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of
any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall
fall or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two
years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time
of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1952).
2. See generally Cole, Insiders"Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958) ; Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 66 HAav. L. Rzv 385, 612 (1953); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory
Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of CorporateInformation by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. Rv.
468 (1947) ; Tracy & Machesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MicH.
L. REv. 1025 (1934) ; Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders; Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 133 (1939).
3. Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106 U.
PA. L. REwv. 1, 30 (1957).
4. The act imposes liability "irrespective of any intention on the part of [the
insider] in entering into such transaction of holding the securty purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months." See note 1 supra.
See Statement of Mr. Corcoran, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557
(1934): "You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell
the security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove
the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have this crude rule of thumb,
because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended,
at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing." Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 92 (1943).
5. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Loss, SEcurnzTs
REGuLATiox 564 (1951); Cook & Feldman, mpra note 2, at 410; Hardee, Stock
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ings are within the category reached by the statute--"any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, . . . within any period of less than six months"
of any equity security by a director, officer or ten per cent stockholder of
the issuing corporation 6 -recovery of profits is automatic, and it is no
defense that the insider in question could in fact have had no access to any
confidential information.7 Moreover, pursuant to the statutory policy "to
establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish
interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty," 8 the courts have uniformly construed 16(b) as
broadly and inclusively as possible.9 The terms "purchase" and "sale"
particularly have been given "the broadest possible connotation," 10 and
the accepted standard of interpretation is that any acquisition or disposal of securities will be held a purchase or sale "which might reasonably be considered in the category of a 'purchase' or 'sale' in connection
with which an insider might profit by the use of confidential information
to the detriment of the outside stockholders and the corporation.""
Acquisitions under various types of options have given the courts some
difficulty in assessing the scope of "purchase" within the terms of the
section; 12 but in all cases to date involving the exercise of warrants,
stock options or conversion rights, the transactions have been held to
fall within the statute.' 3 In the leading case of Park & Tilford, Inc. v.
Optians and the "Insider Trading" Provons of the Securities Exchange Act, 65

HARv. L. REV. 997, 998 (1952) ; Yourd, supra note 2, at 133-34; Comment, 27

TEXAS

L. REV. 840, 841 (1949).

6. See note 1 supra.
7. Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Walet v. Jefferson Lake
Sulphur Co., 202 F2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) ; Comment,
5 STAN. L. REv. 139, 140-41 (1952).
8. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra note 7, at 239.
9. Cole, supra note 2, at 150; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 533 (1950).
10. Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 390-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
11. Ibid. The court in the instant case enunciated the stardard in similar terms:
"Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so defined,
if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the speculation encom-

passed by Section 16 (b)." Instant case at 345. The "kind of transactioe' test, it
should be noted, is not intended to provide for a scheme of abstracted categories with
uniform internal rules such, for example, that all conversion cases or all stock reorganization cases or all warrant cases will be similarly treated. In assessing whether
a given dealing meets the test, the courts have evidenced a willingness to look to all
of the relevant idiosyncratic factors of the particular instance except those bearing
on potential access to confidential information, actual abuse of confidence or insider
intent, as to which see text and notes at notes 4-6 supra. In Roberts v. Eaton, 212
F2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1954), the court, resting its decision upon a detailed analysis of
interlocking factors peculiar to the case, expressly declined "enunciation of a black
letter rubric."
12. Rubin & Feldman, supra note 2, at 485.
13. Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954); Walet v. Jefferson. Lake
Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Shaw v.
Dreyfus, 172 F2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d
984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). Cf. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F.
Supp. 361, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See generally Note, 59 YALE L.J. 510, 533 (1950).
Under its statutory power to exempt particular transactions or classes of transactions from the operation of § 16(b) "as not comprehended within the purpose of this
section," Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 869-70, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
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Schulte,14 defendant insiders, holders of convertible preferred stock that had
been called for redemption at a price lower than the current market value of
the equivalent common, exercised their conversion privilege and subsequently
sold within six months a number of shares of common. Holding the transaction within the purview of 16(b), the court said: "We think a conversion
of preferred into common stock followed by a sale within six months is
a 'purchase and sale' within the statutory language." '- The court further
rejected defendants' argument that conversion was involuntary and "forced,"
holding that "here defendants were not forced to convert, but instead made
an everyday business decision as to the most profitable of three courses of
action-redemption, conversion, or outright sale of their preferred." 16
In declining to hold defendant's conversion a "purchase" in the instant
case, the court reasoned that Ashland preferred, because of its undilutable
conversion privilege was "the economic equivalent of the common, ' '17 so
that to exchange the former for the latter neither gave a holder anything
that he had not already possessed nor created any new speculative opportunity that had not existed from the time of the acquisition of the preferred
in 1948. Moreover, the conversion was "in a very real sense involuntary," 18 inasmuch as the call of the preferred at $27 when its current
common equivalent marketed at $36 left defendant no reasonable alternative. 19 No inside information was necessary to a decision to convert to
avoid a loss of $9 per share; that opportunity was offered equally to all
preferred shareholders and substantially all of them in fact exercised the
(1952), the SEC has promulgated rule X-16B-3, 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3 (Supp. 1958),
exempting acquisition of stock or nontransferable stock options or the purchase of
stock by exercise of such options "pursuant to a bonus, profit-sharing, retirement,
stock option, thrift, savings or similar plan" meeting specified qualifications. But
the Second Circuit has given notice by considered dictum in Greene v. Dietz, 247
F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957), that it deems rule X-16B-3 beyond the SEC's statutory
competence as comprehending transactions which do fall within the purpose of 16(b).
See 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 664. Note that stock options are themselves equity securities
within the purview of the act. Questions involving the acquisition and disposal of
such options, quite apart from their exercise, have been much litigated. See, e.g.,
Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953); Shaw v. Dreyfus, supra; see
Cole, supra note 2; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950).
14. 160 F2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
15. Id. at 987. The court continued: "Whatever doubt might otherwise exist as
to whether a conversion is a 'purchase' is dispelled by the definition of 'purchase' to
include 'any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.' § 3(a) (13). Defendants did not own the common stock in question before they exercised their option to
convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within the meaning

of the Act. The Act certainly applies as well to executed acquisitions as to executory

contracts to acquire.

Not otherwise could the Act accomplish the Congressional

purpose to protect the outside stockholders against at least short-swing speculation by
insiders with advance information."
16. Id. at 988.

17. Instant case at 345.
18. Id. at 346.

19. The court noted that defendant might have avoided the $9 per share loss as

well by outright sale of the preferred shares on the open market as by conversion but

argued that "it can hardly be said that a failure to sell is tantamount to a purchase."
Id. at 346. For discussion see text below note 26 infra.

1959]

RECENT CASES

option.20 Park & Tilford was distinguished in that Park & Tilford preferred had been an unlisted stock with convertible privileges unprotected
from dilution. It was thus essentially unmarketable; insiders who desired
to engage in short-swing speculation could do so only by acquisition of the
commonm2 And whereas the Park & Tilford insiders had had complete
control of the corporation with absolute power to call or not to call the
preferred, defendant in the instant case was a very inactive director, not
in fact privy to any inside information or in exercise of any inside control,
and hence entirely subject to the compulsive pressure of the threatened
$9 loss.
In assessing the cogency of this reasoning, it should first be recalled
that any arguments based upon defendant's innocence and good faith as
disculpatory in themselves are wholly incompetent under the objective
standard of 16(b).22 Similarly, contentions that defendant did only what
the corporation expected and intended that he do,2 and that all stockholders
were treated equally in calling in the preferred,24 if advanced merely to
demonstrate the fairness of defendant's dealings, will not suffice to take
the transaction out of the operation of the section. These last three arguments may, however, be viewed in another light, as subsumed in what the
instant court calls the "involuntary" 2 nature of the conversion. Since
20. Holders of more than 99% of outstanding Ashland convertible preferred
exercised the conversion privilege after call. Instant case at 345.
21. This argument is more fully developed in the district court opinion in the
instant case. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Newman, 163 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Ohio
1957). There it was pointed out that potential Park & Tilford speculators "had to
have common stock, which sold on the New York Stock Exchange, before they could
hope to reap a quick profit." Id. at 507. (Emphasis by the court.) It should be
noted that the Second Circuit opinion in Park & Tilford pursues no such analysis;
in fact it entirely fails to relate that Park & Tilford preferred was unlisted. See text
and note at note 15 supra.
22. See text and note at note 7 supra. The district court in the instant case
expressly places great weight upon defendant's innocence. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Newman, supra note 21, at 508. The court of appeals, although explicitly disavowing
the subjective good faith standard, instant case at 344, seems also somewhat influenced
by the equitably unimpeachable character of defendant's transactions.
23. Under a statute designed to protect outside stockholders and securities investors from the machinations of insiders, acquiescence by the corporation, presumptively controlled by those very insiders, obviously cannot be permitted to legitimate
a transaction which otherwise falls within the ban of the section. Express management approval of contested insider transactions has repeatedly been held no defense
in 16(b) actions. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F2d 843 (2d Cir. 1956) (sale
made at specific instance and request of management to promote potential business
relations between issuing corporation and competitors of defendant inside stockholder) ;
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 202 F.2d
433 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 820 (1953) ; Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d
463 (9th Cir. 1953) (considered dictum).
24. That opportunities to acquire different or additional stock are equally and
nonpreferentially distributed among all existing stockholders does not guarantee that
there will be no room for advantageous exercise of preferentially acquired insider
information in the exercise of those opportunities. See Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d
140 (2d Cir. 1949), where purchase warrants were evenhandedly distributed as stock
dividends to all stockholders of record. Although receipt of the warrants was held
no "purchase' under the act, exercise of those warrants was held a purchase. Id.
at 142. Cf. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). But see Roberts
v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).
25. Instant case at 346.
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volition as going to defendant's actual motivation is withdrawn from
judicial consideration in 16(b) cases, the reasoning of the court seems
to be that the instant situation, being one in which the insider has as a matter
of practicality only one possible course of action, is of a kind which offers
little or no opportunity of speculative abuse. Although the preferred stockholder is offered the three apparent choices of conversion, redemption or
outright sale, sound business judgment conclusively dictates conversion.
Sale of the preferred not only entails surrender of his equity in the corporation, but may run the risk of depressing the market; redemption involves
loss of $9 a share. So compelling are these considerations that owners of
more than ninety-nine per cent of Ashland convertible preferred in fact
elected to convert. Clearly, where all of the open and obvious economic
conditions surrounding the transaction so far supply motive for conversion,
there is little need to fear that potential abuse of confidential information
will further influence the insider's calculus. Such a case, it may be argued,
is quite remote from the type of short-swing double dealing contemplated
by the congressional prohibition.
On the other hand, it should be considered that, however involuntarily
put into a position of election, 26 the insider who holds convertible preferred
will find among his available alternative transactions very different opportunities for future trading. His preferred has been called for redemption
in thirty days. Within that time he must either sell at $36 or convert into
$36 worth of common. Possible confidential information as to what may
be expected to happen to common stock values at a time subsequent to the
thirty-day period but within six months may well be a factor in that decision. In the instant case, the common stock increased in value shortly
after the thirty days and defendant sold, realizing a profit he would not
have made on earlier sale of the preferred. The view of the court, then,
that defendant's conversion "created no opportunity for profit which had
27
not existed" already as inherent in the possession of the preferred,
forgets that whatever speculative opportunity inhered in the preferred was
threatened with imminent expiration and that to pursue any trading advantage expected (whether or not through abuse of insider knowledge) at
26. In Park & Tilford, where the elective privilege of conversion was in fact
more narrowly circumscribed than that of defendant in the instant case because the
Park & Tilford insiders were trustees required by state law to follow the alternative
which preserved the highest integral value of the stock holdings, conversion was said
to be voluntary and was held a purchase. See text and notes at notes 15, 16 supra.
The instant court attempts to distinguish Park & Tilford on the ground that whereas
the Park & Tilford insiders were in actual control of the corporation and could have
defeated the calling of convertible preferred for redemption, defendant here was a
very inactive director without any such powers of control. To this it may be argued
that under the objective rule of thumb prescribed by 16(b), persons enumerated in
that section--directors, officers and ten per cent stockholders-may be conclusively
presumed to have whatever "control" is requisite for liability under the act. "[T]he
persons liable . . . and the measure of liability are both based upon arbitrary rules
of thumb, independent of any proof of actual use of confidential information." Cook
& Feldman, supra note 2, at 410. See text and notes at notes 4, 5 supra.
27. Instant case at 346. (Emphasis added.)
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a later date, defendant had to have the common. What is true, as suggested above, is that far more probably than not, an insider's action in this
posture will be dictated by other legitimate motives rather than the intent
to get out on the short swing. But can it therefore be said, under the
standard adopted by the instant court, that the transaction here is not "of
"...,?
2s The
a kind which can possibly lend itself to . . speculation. .
criterion of mere possibility has in fact been that adopted by prior decisions 29 and seems most suited to the congressional intent to wholly incapacitate insiders from deriving profits on short-swing trading set up by
acquisitions susceptible of motivation by confidential information. By subjecting the transactions here involved to 16(b), those legitimate objectives
which more probably, but not to the exclusion of all possibility of abuse,
motivate conversion are not frustrated. The holder of preferred may at
his option convert, saving his $9 per share from redemption, retaining his
control in the corporation and avoiding a possible flood of sales on the
market. But whatever speculative opportunity would otherwise have inhered in conversion, as compared with sale, has been sterilized. In sum,
it is submitted that the instant court should have followed Park & Tilford3 0
in holding the conversion a "purchase" under the act.31
28. Id. at 345. (Emphasis added.) See note 11 supra.
29. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.Zd
689 (2d Cir. 1957), 1957 U. IL.. L.F. 664 (considered dictum that SEC cannot
exempt a class of transactions as not within purpose of 16(b) despite SEC contention
that possibility of speculative abuse is slight; see note 13 supra). See text and notes
at notes 9, 10, 11 supra. But .see Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954), where
a more lenient test may have been applied.
30. It is conceded that the distinctions noted by the court between Park & Tilford
and the instant case are relevant and persuasive and that the situation here is a more
difficult one for application of 16(b) inasmuch as there will in general be fewer
instances in which conversion may serve as a speculative instrument where both
stocks are equally marketable and tend to sell at equivalent values. But under the
any-possibility-of-abuse test, see text and notes at notes 11, 29 supra, enough danger
appears to inhere even in the latter instance to call for the applicability of the section.
A more difficult case still would be a conversion where the convertible security has
not yet been called for redemption and the conversion privilege is due to remain
viable for more than six months to come. In such a case, there seems little conceivable speculative opportunity in holding common which does not also inhere in the
possession of convertible preferred. This seems to be the situation envisaged in Note,
59 YALE L.J. 510, 524 (1950), where it is argued that conversion should not be deemed
a "purchase" for 16(b) purposes. But see Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d
Cir. 1954), where an exchange of stock of A corporation for stock of B corporation,
a holding company whose whole assets were shares of A corporation stock, was held
a "sale' within 16(b) although the court recognized that the intrinsic value of B
stock was absolutely tied to the underlying A stock. It is suggested that, absent a
finding in the individual case of factors which would tend to create greater market
demand under stipulated conditions for the conversion stock than for the convertible
stock (such might be the case, for instance, where a customary lag in processing
conversion notices so far exceeds the corporation's usual processing time for the
recording of stock transfers that rumors of an imminent common stock dividend
might cause disparity of common and convertible preferred prices for a short period
immediately preceding a rumored cut-off date), conversion of a stock where loss of
the conversion privilege is not impending should not be held a "purchase" for 16(b)
purposes, since whatever profits may inure to the insider from subsequent sale are not
legitimately attributable to the six-month short swing.
31. This result is in accord with the analysis in Note, 59 YAiL L.J. 510, 525-26

(1950).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-APmFAL MAY B, TAKEN TO ONE
COUNT OF MULTI-COUNT CONVICTION WHEPE CONCUMMNT SENTENCES HA57v BEEN IMPOSED
Convicted on three counts of an indictment charging him with possessing, forging, and uttering a stolen United States Treasury check,1
defendant was sentenced to three years on each count, the sentences to run
concurrently. When defendant appealed only the conviction on the second
count, possessing a stolen check, 2 the Government moved to dismiss on
the ground that the failure to attack all the counts made the appeal futile
and without merit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied the motion to dismiss and reversed the judgment on count
two.3 United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1958).
Federal appellate courts generally will not consider on the merits
claims of error relating to conviction on one or more counts of a multicount indictment where the trial court imposed concurrent sentences, and
conviction under at least one count is admittedly proper. 4 The rationale
of the rule, which originated in Claassen v. United States,5 is that an appeal
under such circumstances would be futile, since the appellant remains
obligated to serve his original sentence regardless of the outcome of the
appeal. In that case the defendant was convicted on five of eleven counts,
and sentenced to six years on a general judgment which made no reference
to any specific counts. On appeal the Supreme Court considered only
the sufficiency of the first count and stated that "in any criminal case a
general verdict and judgment on an indictment or information containing
several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is
good and warrants the judgment, because, in the absence of anything in
the record to show the contrary, the presumption of law is that the court
awarded sentence on the good count only." 6 While the Claassen doctrine
was predicated upon a situation where a general judgment making no
reference to specific counts was issued, it has been extended to preclude
1. Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1708 and 495 (1952). Defendant was acquitted on
a fourth count, which charged unlawful possession of another such check.
2. Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1952).
3. The court also vacated the sentences on the remaining two counts and remanded
the action for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.
4. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958); Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640 (1946) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
All eleven federal circuits have had occasion to apply the rule. See cases collected
25A FED. DIG. Criminal Law § 1177 (1951). State courts have adopted the same
rule for the most part. See, e.g., People v. Ponce, 96 Cal. App. 2d 327, 215 P.2d
75 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); People v. Podsiad, 295 Mich. 541, 295 N.W. 257 (1940);
State v. Merritt, 231 N.C. 59, 55 S.E.2d 804 (1949). But see People v. Branch, 119
Cal. App. 2d 490, 260 P.2d 27 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). See also cases collected DEC.
DiG. Criminal Law § 1177.
5. 142 U.S. 140 (1891).
6. Id. at 146. For a recent case with dictum indicating that the Supreme Court
may still follow the Claasen rule today, but nevertheless reversing a concurrent sentence,
see Greene v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 340 (1959).
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review where concurrent sentences have been imposed and a defendant is
appealing less than all of the separate counts on which he has been
7
convicted.
For almost forty years the federal courts have consistently applied the
modified Claassen rule in the multitude of cases which have presented the
problem.8 Indeed, the Claassen doctrine has become so imbedded in the
law that its mandate is currently applied automatically and universally
without consideration of the facts in any individual case. The instant court
does not attempt to discard Claassen completely but rather suggests that
an examination of the circumstances in a multi-count appeal should be
made before the doctrine of automatic dismissal takes effect. The court
stated:
."[W)efeel constrained to entertain an appeal such as this whenever the nature of the error committed below or other circumstances
suggest that the accused might have received a longer sentence than
otherwise would have been imposed, or that he has been prejudiced
by the results of the proceedings." 9
It is submitted that this relaxation of the Claassenrule is correct. Putting
aside the question whether the Claassen presumption that the sentence was
awarded on the good count only is valid, its application in a situation where
concurrent sentences are issued on a multi-count indictment is not readily
justifiable. In the latter instance the defendant is convicted and sentenced
for separate crimes. By definition the defendant is sentenced on each
count. There is no reason to presume that the sentence was on the good
count only; indeed the presumption is exactly the opposite. Concurrent
sentences are awarded with an awareness of the multi-count conviction and
are imposed with this in mind. Thus, concurrent sentences imposed for a
conviction of eleven offenses may not be identical in terms of length with
the sentence which would be imposed if only one of the eleven offenses
were properly sustainable.' 0 In cases where reversal on less than all
counts has occurred, the courts have recognized that reduction in sentence
may often follow." The instant case is itself a good example, since, on
7. See cases cited note 4 supra.
8. The last federal case to reject the Claassen doctrine was Robinson v. United
States, 30 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1929). It has been sixty-three years since the Supreme
Court failed to apply the doctrine. Putnam v. United States, 162 U.S. 687 (1896).
There have been other examples of its rejection in cases of similar although not
identical situations. See, e.g., Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187 (1895), which
involved a general judgment rather than conviction on each of separate counts. In
United States v. Tarricone, 242 F2d 555 (2d Cir. 1957), and United States v. DiCanio,
245 F2d 713 (2d Cir. 1957), where one count became merged in the aggravated
offense of the other count, the court held that the sentence under the count setting
forth the lesser offense must be set aside.
9. Instant case at 563.
10. See Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958). In Yates, the defendant
appealed all eleven counts.
11. See ibid; Robinson v. United States, 30 F.2d 25, 29 (6th Cir. 1929), where
the court stated: "Under the circumstances of this case, the imprisonment sentence
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remand, the district court reduced the sentences from three years to two
years on the remaining two counts. 12 The Claassen rule presumes that
the district judge gives the same punishment on a one-count conviction as
he does on a multi-count conviction, thereby making it futile for defendant
to appeal one of the counts. The underlying theory is faulty, however,
since there is at least a probability that the sentence will be reduced in some
proportion to the reduction of guilty counts. Application of the Claassen
doctrine in the instant case may also have deprived defendant of an earlier
parole. The legislative purpose of the federal parole system is the restoration of good risk offenders to society.' 3 Thus, the parole board is granted
discretionary power to release prisoners upon such criteria as "a reasonable
probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without
violating the laws," and "if in the opinion of the Board such release is not
inconsistent with the welfare of society." 14 The practical result is that a
prisoner serving a sentence for one count stands better in the eyes of the
parole board than a prisoner serving a sentence for many counts, and this
is true even if we assume both prisoners are serving identical sentences
in terms of time. 15 The instant court's determination not to apply Claassen
may also be justified on one final ground. The "stigma" of being labeled
a multi-count offender lasts long after the parole board stage of a man's
life. The danger of the situation is particularly apparent when a man
carries a morally reprehensible crime on his record simply because he was
simultaneously guilty of a far less heinous offense. For example, under
the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act ' one can simultaneously be
indicted for selling heroin to juveniles 17 and for having in his possession
a narcotic drug.' 8 A defendant convicted on both of these counts would
be seriously prejudiced if he were not allowed to appeal the conviction
for peddling heroin to juveniles although he admits guilt as to possession.
On the other hand, if entertaining a concurrent sentence appeal would be
futile in terms of practical value to the defendant, application of the Claassen
rule is judicially sound. For example, where a defendant is appealing
only one minor count of a dozen-count conviction, it would appear to be a
upon the four counts having been deemed by the trial judge to be appropriate punishment also for the five, we are not clear that the sentence as to the four ought to stand
and at the same time a new trial be had as to the five. . . . The convictions and
sentences upon the first five counts are reversed, the convictions upon the last four
counts are affirmed, but the sentences thereon are reversed; and the case remanded
for further proceedings."
12. Letter From Benson H. Begun, Counsel for Defendant, to University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 17, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania.
13. Neal v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1949).
14. 18U. S. C. §4203(a) (1952).
15. See Hibon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 1953): "[I]t is
well understood that a multiplicity of sentences impairs a prisoner's opportunities for
pardon or parole."
16. 42 Stat. 598 (1922), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 171-84 (1952).
17. 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. § 176a (Supp. V, 1958).
18. 42 Stat. 596 (1922), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952).
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waste of time for the court to hear the appeal. The focus in any given
case, however, should be to determine whether reversal of one or more
counts could reasonably result in important advantages to the defendant.
The instant court is really advocating no more than the use of judicial
discretion in each appeal, rather than automatic dismissal under the
Claassen rule.

INCOME TAX-CONTRIBUTIONS IN AID

OP CAPITAL CONsTucTION MADE BY PROSPECTIVE CUSTOMERS TO CORPORATION 1EL
TAXAIZ AS INCoME TO CORPORATION

Hills surrounding the cities of Wilkes-Barre and Kingston, Pennsylvania prevent adequate reception of television signals by means of conventional roof-top antennas. In order to provide television service for the
community, petitioner, a Pennsylvania corporation, planned to construct
a mountain-top tower by means of which television signals could be intercepted, and to convey those signals by coaxial cables an average distance
of five miles to home television sets. Because of the high degree of risk
present in this pioneer business' and the fear that UHF stations might
make the system obsolete within a short time,2 it was decided that adequate
capital could best be raised by obtaining contributions from prospective customers. Contributors were divided into two classes-residential and commercial, with the latter making a somewhat larger initial contribution.3
The program also provided for a monthly maintenance and service charge
when the system became operative.4 Customers signed a contract with
petitioner company whereby payment of the initial contribution was required to make the customer eligible to pay the monthly maintenance charge
which entitled him to receive the signal. Petitioner segregated all funds
received as contributions and applied them only to construction costs; the
monthly charges were used for normal operating expenses. In filing its
income tax return, petitioner neither included the contributions from subscribers in gross income nor claimed depreciation for the facilities constructed with them. The Commissioner, however, treated the contribu1. Only two community antenna systems were available for close study-one in
operation at Lansford, Pennsylvania and one under construction in Pottsville, Pennsylvania. Instant case at 106.
2. At the time petitioner was organized in 1951 there were no UHF stations in
the vicinity, but it was known that applications were on file. In fact, what at one time
was a system high of 900 customers had fallen by 1956 to 400 due to UHF competition. Instant case at 106.
3. Commercial customers made an initial payment of $200, while residential
customers paid $145. Instant case at 107.
4. The monthly charge was six dollars for commercial customers and four dollars
for residential customers. Instant case at 107.
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tions as gross income and determined a tax deficiency for the two-year
period covered by the returns, at the same time allowing a deduction for
depreciation of the physical assets. Petitioner contested this ruling and a
subsequent tax court affirmance. The court of appeals sustained the determination, holding that the contributions were part payment for services
rendered and consequently taxable as gross income. Teleservice Co. v.
Commissioner, 254 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 919 (1958).
Gross income, as defined by the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, includes "gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal services of whatever kind and in whatever form
paid . . . or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." 5 Petitioner contended, however, that the payments by subscribers
were "contributions to capital," and thus came within the long recognized
exception to gross income laid down initially in Edwards v. Cuba R.R.,0
in which subsidies paid by the Cuban government to induce railroad construction were held not taxable as gross income. Later decisions have
extended the Cuba Railroad doctrine to cases in which residents contributed to a fund to make cash or property available as an inducement to
a manufacturer to locate in the community,7 and to cases in which companies donated property or cash to other firms in order to induce expansion
or relocation.8 The doctrine has also been applied when, as in the instant
case, the making of the contributions was a condition precedent to receiving
service, chiefly when residents of rural areas have paid costs of transmission
lines as well as monthly service charges in order to receive electric light and
power,9 and when railroad customers have made contributions toward the
costs of spur track facilities and also paid the normal service rates.' 0 There
is no question, as the court conceded, that some of these cases are factually
indistinguishable from the instant case. The court reasoned, however, that
a broader concept of income has recently been advanced by the Supreme

Court-that of "tax[ing] all gains except those specifically exempted.""
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §22(a), 53 Stat 9.
6. 268 U.S. 628 (1925). For conflicting views as to the correctness of the
doctrine of this case, compare Rottschaefer, The Cocept of Income in Federal Taxatim, 13 MINN. L. Rv. 637 (1929), with Harvey, Some Indicia of Capital Tramsfers
Under the Federal Income Tax Laws, 37 Micn. L. REV. 745 (1939).
7. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950); Commissioner v.
McKay Prods. Corp., 178 F2d 639 (3d Cir. 1949); Frank Holton & Co., 10 B.T.A.
1317 (1928).
8. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1942);
Kauai Ry., 13 B.T.A. 686 (1928).
9. Tampa Elec. Co., 12 B.T.A. 1002 (1928); Wisconsin Hydro-Elec. Power Co.,
10 B.T.A. 933 (1928); El Paso Elec. Ry., 10 B.T.A. 79 (1928); Rio Elec. Co., 9
B.T.A. 1332 (1928) ; Liberty Light & Power Co., 4 B.T.A. 155 (1926).
10. Union Pac. R.R., 26 B.T.A. 1126 (1932); Texas & Pac. Ry., 9 B.T.A. 365
(1927); Great No. Ry., 8 B.T.A. 225, aff'd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1927).
11. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1953) (gain to employee exercising stock purchase option held taxable); accord, General Am. Investors Co. v.
Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955) ("insider profits" received pursuant to Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 held taxable as income) ; Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426 (1955) (punitive treble damages held includable as gross income).
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The court also relied heavily upon Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner,12
in which the Supreme Court, in holding that payments made by customers
to aid in power line construction could not be included in depredation basis,
stated that
"it overtaxes the imagination to regard the farmers and other customers
who furnished these funds as makers either of donations or contributions to the company. The transactions neither in form nor in substance bore such a semblance. The payments were to the customer the
price of the service." 13
The court viewed this case as removing payments which were the price of
service from the contributions-to-capital exemption.
Although DetroitEdison has been viewed as foreshadowing a contraction of the Cuba Railroaddoctrine,' 4 the instant case is the first to apply the
rationale of Detroit Edison to hold payments received from prospective
customers includable within gross income in situations factually indistinguishable from decisions to the contrary based on the Cuba Railroad
doctrine. However, the opinion of the instant court does not indicate a complete rejection of the Cuba Railroad doctrine and the decisions which
developed thereunder. The court distinguished Cuba Railroad factually.' 5
Moreover, when section 118 of the 1954 Code,' 6 providing that "gross
income does not include any contribution to the capital of the taxpayer,"
is considered in connection with section 36 2 (c),17 providing that property
or money acquired by a corporation as a contribution to capital takes a zero
basis when contributed by a non-shareholder, it becomes clear that some
contributions by non-shareholders are exempted. Although those provisions were not applicable to the instant case, there is no question but that
the court would refuse to view the contributions here made as coming
within their purview.' 8 The extent to which future payments by nonshareholders will be held includable in income thus seems likely to depend
on the distinction drawn between the factual situation present in the
instant case and that of Cuba Railroad. The court regarded as controlling
the fact that the contributions in question were made by prospective cus12. 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
13. Id. at 102-03.
14. Note, 3 TAx L. REv. 568 (1948).
15. Instant case at 112. In order to reach its result, the only alternative to distinguishing Cuba Railroad would have been for the court to conclude that it had been
overruled by Detroit Edison. Such a position would appear untenable.

16. Ir.

REv CODE OF 1954, § 118.

17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362(c).

18. "[T]he Committee Reports accompanying Sections 118 and 362 of the 1954
Code (also cited by taxpayer) make it clear these provisions are not applicable to
contributions or other payments by persons who are direct beneficiaries of the service
rendered by the recipient corporation." Instant case at 112-13.
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tomers of the taxpayer, and were required as a prerequisite to receiving
service. Emphasis was also given to the absence of a community or public
benefit, as opposed to a direct benefit to the individual contributor. Applying these tests to the various types of cases formerly held as falling within
the contributions-to-capital exemption,' 9 it would appear that contributions
for power line and spur track extensions are includable within gross income
under the rule of the instant case,20 although they may not be so treated
by the Internal Revenue Service.21 On the other hand, general community
donations to induce plant relocation, where the only benefit to the individual is the over-all benefit to the community, apparently will still be held
excludable from gross income 2 2 A more difficult situation is that in which
one company induces another to relocate near it by offering cash or property. In such a case the direct benefit to the individual merges with the
general benefit to the community. In view of the fact that the payment in
such a case is a prerequisite not to service but merely to more efficient or
advantageous service, it would appear to fall outside the rule of the instant
case. From an economic viewpoint, the instant case seems likely to operate
as a deterrent to expansion into high risk enterprises or marginal service
areas. To the extent that corporate taxpayers decide that expansion can
be justified only if construction costs are paid in advance by those directly
benefiting from the expansion, the inclusion in gross income of contributions made by these persons will increase the amount of the contribution
required. Particularly where the contributors are private individuals, this
increase will have a tendency to contract substantially the area in which
expansion will be feasible 2 4 The effect is somewhat decreased by the fact
that a deduction can be taken for depreciation of the assets purchased with
19. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
20. Assuming, of course, that the contributions are made by prospective customers
rather than by the community at large.
21. The Commissioner has indicated that he will distinguish payments made
to public utilities by prospective customers, continuing to treat them as excludable
from income in accordance with past decisions cited in notes 9, 10 supra. 1 CCH
1959 STAND. FED. TAx RE:P. f[ 631.6884 (TIR).
22. See Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956).
23. The approach adopted by the American Law Institute in its proposed statute
differs somewhat from both the 1939 and 1954 Code provisions. Contributions to
capital are excluded from gross income and given a substituted basis. These contributions are defined as those made by shareholders and those made for a "public purpose,"
"neither as payments for goods or services furnished . . . nor a payment in lieu of
income or to supplement income."
ALI FED. INcOME TAX STAT. §§X107(k),
X276(b) (7) (Feb. 1954 Draft). It is clear that the payments made in the instant
case and in Detroit Edison would be without the scope of this exclusion. They would
be, however, within the ptovision excluding "contributions to operating facilities,"
which contributions are those made "in order that the enterprise may extend its service

to prospective customers making the contribution." Id. § X107(1) & comment. These
contributions take a zero basis. Id. §X277(b) (10).
24. In the view of the drafters of the ALI statute, failure to exclude initial charges
for television cable systems from income may make the construction of such systems
impractical. Id. § X107(l), comment.
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contributed funds.2 Whether the remaining deterrence is sufficiently great
to require or justify special treatment for corporate taxpayers receiving
contributions of this nature, however, is a matter for congressional, rather
than judicial, determination.

LABOR LAW-EMPLOYER DOMINATION op LABOR-MANfAGEMENT
COMMITTEE NOT AN UN:FAR LABOR PRCTIOE

To promote increased production and efficiency in critical industries
during World War II, the War Production Board encouraged the formation of employee-management committees. With the Board's approval
employees at petitioner's plants periodically elected representatives to committees which, during the ensuing years, met monthly with management
representatives and discussed and made recommendations concerning problems of mutual interest including safety, efficiency, seniority, job classifications, working schedules, vacations and sick leave, and improvement of
working facilities. Employer assisted in holding the committee elections
and meetings, and defrayed all expenses of the committees. The committees functioned in both unionized and non-union plants, and in the latter
they presented individual employee grievances to management. The National Labor Relations Board ordered petitioner to disestablish the committees because they were employer-dominated labor organizations.' The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing, held that the committees
were not "labor organizations" as defined in section 2(5) of the Taft25. In Detroit Edison the assets purchased with contributed funds were held not
depreciable, the Court reasoning that the payments could not be considered part of
the cost of the assets to the taxpayer. The Court's refusal to view the payments as
capital contributions took the basis question out of the operation of § 113(a) (8) (B)
of the 1939 Code (ch. 1, 53 Stat. 42), which provided that capital contributions
took the basis of the transferor. The question of depreciability of the assets thus
became dependent upon an interpretation of §113 (ch. 1, 53 Stat. 40), now §1012,
providing that the basis of property shall be its cost. It must be noted, however,
that in that case the contributions had not been taxed originally as income and had
depreciation been allowed the taxpayer would have received a double benefit. Under
the 1954 Code, contributions to capital, made non-taxable as income by §118, take
a zero basis for depreciation purposes, under § 362, when made by a non-shareholder,
thus eliminating the double benefit possibility in Cuba Railroad-type cases. It seems
fairly certain that had the payments in Detroit Edison been taxed as income, a different
conclusion would have been reached on the depreciation question. Under the provisions of the 1954 Code, the Commissioner will apparently disallow deductions for
depreciation of assets purchased with funds received as contributions in aid of capital
construction only to the extent that the amounts so received were not reported as
taxable income to the corporation. 1 CCH 1959 STAND. FFD. TAx REP. 1631.6884
(TIR).
1. A disestablishment order is the usual practice in the event of dominated labor
organizations. See, e.g., NLRB v. Folk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940) ; NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939); 16 NLRB ANN.
REP. 155 (1951).
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Hartley Act 2 but were authorized by section 9(a) 8 which permits individuals and groups of employees to present grievances to their employer.
Domination of the committees by petitioner was therefore not an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a) (2). 4 Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB,
256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 863 (1958) (No. 329).
Congress in section 2(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act has defined a "labor
organization" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of work." ' It is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to dominate or support the formation or administration of any
such organization. 6 By amendment to section 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act,7 Congress, in seeking to overrule prior decisions 8 that
adjustment of individual and group grievances could be made only with the
consent and participation of the bargaining representative, 9 provided that
individuals and groups of employees may, without union intervention, effect
final settlements of "grievances" not inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement, provided the union representative is given an opportunity
to be present at the adjustment. 10 Several courts have recognized a conflict
between the right of groups to adjust grievances independent of the
collective bargaining process or agreement, and the right of a labor organization as exclusive bargaining representative to deal with employers conIn a case arising under circumstances similar to
cerning grievances."
2. Labor Management Relations Act, § 2(5), 61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(5) (1952) (hereinafter cited by LMRA section number only): "The term
'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
3. LMRA § 9(a): "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of
a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given the opportunity to be present at such
adjustment."
4. LMRA § 8(a) (2) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization
or to contribute financial or other support to it ..
5. LMRA §2(5). See note 2 supra.
6. LMRA § 8(a) (2). See note 4 .upra.
7. Ch. 372, §9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
8. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
9. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947), quoted note 36 infra.
10. LMRA § 9(a). See note 3 supra.
11. See cases cited notes 12, 13 infra.
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those in the instant case, the Sixth Circuit held an employer-dominated employee committee was not a labor organization but a group under section 9(a).12 Distinguishing grievances in 9(a) from those in 2(5), the
court said 2(5) grievances included those "major" disputes which are the
subjects of collective bargaining-wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment-and which affect employees as a class or fix the future rules
of employment for everyone in the unit. Section 9(a) grievances were said
to be those claims, peculiar to individuals or groups, that their rights under
the collective bargaining agreement have not been respected, raising questions of the meaning of the contract or involving situations not covered by
the contract with respect to which an adjustment is made.'3 In all other
cases determining the status of employee-management committees similar to
those in the instant case, whether or not the decision was based on this
test, such committees were held to be labor organizations and ordered disestablished since they adjusted grievances or dealt with employers concerning conditions of employment or other subjects of collective bargaining, even
though, as in the instant case, no collective bargaining agreement was
contemplated. 4 The Second Circuit, however, holding that a minority
union may adjust grievances under 9(a), has rejected the grievance distinction and suggested that grievances in both sections include all disputes in connection with the employment relationship not inconsistent with
the collective bargaining agreement. 15 The instant court similarly rejected
the grievance distinction as a basis for determining whether the committees
were labor organizations. Instead, it rested its holding that petitioner's
committees were not labor organizations on two grounds: first, the term
"dealing with" in 2(5) means "bargaining with," and since this group of
employees "avoided the usual concept of collective bargaining" and did not
"exist for the purpose of negotiating or bargaining with employers," it was
not a labor organization. Second, the court concluded it was the intention
of Congress that the act should permit the existence of employee-management committees.:'
12. NLRB v. Associated Machs., 219 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1955).
13. The distinction has also been drawn in other contexts. See Elgin, J. & E.R.R.
Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722 (1945) (Railway Labor Act); West Texas Util.
Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.Zd 442 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1955)
(refusal to bargain collectively) ; Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F2d 69 (5th Cir.
1945) (union's right to adjust grievances under NLRA § 9(a)).
14. See, e.g., NLRB v. Standard Coil Prods. Co., 224 F.2d 465 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955); NLRB v. Sharples Chems., Inc., 209 F.2d 645
(6th Cir. 1954) ; Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953) ;
NLRB v. General Shoe Corp., 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
904 (1952); Gullett Gin Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 340 U.S. 361 (1950).
15. Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Wholesale Dep't Store Union, CIO, 173 F.2d
764 (2d Cir. 1949). For a criticism of this holding see West Texas Util. Co. v. NLRB,
206 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1955) ; Developnents it
the Law-The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 H.Av. L. Rxv. 781, 843-44 (1951).
16. Instant case at 285-89. The second ground of the court's holding is discussed
at notes 36-38 infra.

736

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

The instant court's rejection of the distinction between 9(a) and
2(5) grievances as a basis for determining whether or not petitioner's
committees were labor organizations seems realistic in light of modem collective bargaining practices. A certified bargaining representative, clearly
a labor organization as defined in section 2(5), may properly present any
grievance of an individual in the bargaining unit at his request pursuant
to provisions in collective bargaining contracts which embody procedures
for such adjustment.17 Moreover, few grievance adjustments are strictly
individual. The union has an interest in seeing that successive adjustments of even petty individual grievances are uniformly applied. Moreover,
any adjustment involving an interpretation of the bargaining contract will
inevitably affect other employees subject to the contract and therefore affect
8
the future status of the employment relationship.'
Nevertheless, it does not appear that the instant court's holding that
petitioner's committees "avoided the usual concept of collective bargaining" and had no "bargaining powers" is a test that should be determinative
of their status. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as "any organization . . . which exists for the purpose . . . of dealing with employers. . . ." 19 The instant court held that the term "dealing with"
means "bargaining with" and that since collective bargaining is a process of
negotiation which looks toward the making of an agreement, and petitioner's committees had no intent to make an agreement, those committees
were not labor organizations 2 0 The result of this reasoning is that any
representative group which does not collectively bargain is not a labor
organization under section 2(5). However, it is clear that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the formation
of a group which is seeking recognition as the certified bargaining representative, 2 ' but which by the terms of section 9(a) may not, until so
recognized, represent employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.2
It would seem, therefore, that whether a representative body of employees
performs the functions of collective bargaining is not determinative of
whether employer domination of that group is an unfair labor practice.
Conceding, however, that the ultimate purpose of a labor organization is
to achieve that status which will enable it to collectively bargain, it appears
that the instant court unduly restricted its definition of the term "bargain17. See MATrHws, L AoR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 344-45 (1953). See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958).
18. It is true, however, that arbitrators often feel free to disregard prior awards,
and the doctrine of stare decisis has limited application in the settlement of grievances.
See, e.g., In re Gorton-Pew Fisheries Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 365 (1951) ; In re General
Elec. Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 757 (1948). However, the following of precedent is conducive
to good labor relations and avoids a multiplicity of disputes.
19. LMRA §2(5). See note 2 supra.
20. Instant case at 285.
21. See LMRA §§ 8(a) (2), 9(b). See, e.g., NLRB v. L. Ronney & Sons Furniture Mfg. Co., 206 F2d 730 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 937 (1954) ; American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1942).
22. LMRA § 9(a). See note 3 supra.
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ing." Collective bargaining is a continuing process which involves, not
merely the making of an agreement, but preliminary negotiation and day-today resolution of employer-employee problems whether or not covered by
a contract.2 Thus, the presentation by the employee-management committees of recommendations on such subjects as seniority, work schedules,
vacations and sick leave, and the resultant decision on those recommendations were in themselves a form of collective bargaining. 24 It would seem,
therefore, that the employer domination of these committees was an unfair
labor practice.
However, even if the instant court's holding that petitioner's committees were not labor organizations is correct, it would seem, nevertheless,
that petitioner's assistance in holding elections, requiring the calling of meetings at specified times, and defraying of expenses necessary to the operation
of the committees 25 were an unfair interference with employees' right to
engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection.2 6 Employees' right to self-organize, "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection"
is guaranteed by section 7 of the act.2 7 Employer interference with section
7 rights is an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (1).28 The very
existence of an employee representative group and the election of representatives thereto are probably in themselves "concerted activities . . . for
other mutual aid or protection." " If so, petitioner's interference is clearly
prohibited by section 8(a) (1). While "concerted activities" generally
refers to employees' right to engage in strikes, picketing and other forms
of economic pressure,3 0 and not every form of concerted activity is given
protection under sections 7 and 8(a) (1),31 the right to act collectively may
23. See, e.g., the language of the opinion in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46

(1957): "Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of
new problems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee
rights already secured by contract"

24. Ibid.
25. See instant case at 283.
26. LMRA § 7: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . .

27. Ibid.
28. LMRA § 8(a) (1): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7."
29. LMRA § 7. See note 26 supra.
30. See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th
Cir. 1953) ; Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951).
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. 3. I. Case Co., 198 F2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 917 (1953) (seizure of employers' business) ; Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v.
NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949) (circulation of petition for removal of foreman);
NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944) (wildcat strike).
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be exercised irrespective of the existence of a labor organization, 32 and
collective bargaining need not be contemplated. 33 Petitioner, therefore,
having supervised elections and organized the committees interfered with
rights guaranteed employees by section 7, irrespective of whether labormanagement committees are labor organizations. However, even if the
formation and operation of the committees were not "concerted activities,"
section 7 guarantees employees the right to self-organization. Where, as in
petitioner's non-union plants, this right remains as yet unexercised, the
establishment and subsequent domination of an employee representative
group, by giving employees a false sense of independent representation, may
undercut unionization and prevent or forestall any employee self-organization. In dealing with a dominated group the employer is in fact dealing
with himself. This would seem to preclude the equality of representation
and fair handling of disputes contemplated by the act.
The instant court based its decision principally on the congressional
history of the 9(a) proviso. The court felt that, although the Conference
Committee rejected a House Hartley Bill amendment 3 4 permitting the
formation by employer of employee committees to discuss subjects of collective bargaining in the absence of a certified bargaining representative,
that amendment was implicit in the amended 9(a) proviso. The court
based its conclusion on the fact that the conference report indicated that
the House provision was omitted because the 9(a) proviso gave sufficient
employee protection in allowing individual and group settlement of grievances. Therefore, the court concluded, Congress intended to include labormanagement committees within the guarantees of the 9(a) proviso. 35
However, the history of the amended provision is clear in only one respect.
Congress intended merely to overrule prior decisions that the adjustment
of individual grievances could be made only with the intervention of the
bargaining representative as a party to the decision, and to create an independent right in individuals and groups to confer with employers and adjust
32. See Salt River Valley Water Users' Assn v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir.
1953); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, supra note 31; NLRB v. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 903 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948) ; Western
Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1944).
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 32; Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 710
(1940). The Board has held, e.g., that solicitation on behalf of a union, Marshall
Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), attendance at conference with employer, Camp
& McInnes, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 524 (1952), and petitioning employer not to recognize
a union as bargaining representative, Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Ashville, 97 N.L.R.B.
503 (1951), are among the concerted activities protected by the act.
34. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (3) (1947): "Notwithstanding any
other provision of this section, the following shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act: Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and discussing with it matters of
mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working
conditions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not recognized a representative as their representative under Section 9."

35. Instant case at 285-89.
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individual rights3 8 The expressed intent neither considers nor indicates
that a dominated employee committee was intended to come within the
protection of the 9(a) proviso. To conclude that Congress considered the
Hartley amendment implicit in section 9(a) because, rejecting the amendment, it felt 9(a) gave sufficient employee protection would seem to be a
less reasonable inference than that Congress felt 9(a) was sufficient in itself
and as far as the legislature wanted to go, and therefore something less than
the Hartley amendment was intended. Moreover, the Hartley amendment
permitted labor-management committees to perform the functions of a
bargaining representative only in the absence of a certified bargaining representative.3 7 The instant committees did more than adjust grievances in
non-union plants; they performed functions of a bargaining representative
in already unionized plants-functions which would have been prohibited
even by the Hartley amendment.38 It seems clear, therefore, that labormanagement committees of the type instituted by petitioner are within
neither the provisions nor the policy of the Taft-Hartley Act nor intended
to be so by Congress.
36. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947) : "Section 9(a) : The
revisions of section 9 relating to representation cases make a number of important
changes in existing law. An amendment contained in the revised proviso for section
9(a) clarifies the right of individual employees or groups of employees to present
grievances. The Board has not given full effect to this right as defined in the present
statute since it has adopted a doctrine that if there is a bargaining representative he
must be consulted at every stage of the grievance procedure, even though the individual
employee might prefer to exercise his right to confer with his employer alone. The
current Board practice received some support from the courts in the Hughes Tool
case (147 F. (2d) 756 [sic]) a decision which seems inconsistent with another
circuit court's reversal of the Board in NLRB v. North Aimerican Aviation Company
(136 F. (2d) 898). The revised language would make it clear that the employer's
right to present grievances exists independently of the rights of the bargaining representative, if the bargaining representative has been given an opportunity to be present
at the adjustment, unless the adjustment is contrary to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement then in effect."
37. See note 34 supra.
38. As has been shown (see cases cited notes 12, 14 supra), numerous irreconclled conflicts have arisen among the courts with regard to the interpretation of the
roll which Congress intended to relegate to the section 9(a) proviso. The instant
decision is but one aspect of that confusion. While it is beyond the scope of this
Comment to develop the point further, it may be well to point out that interpretations
of this section as now constituted are not only presently irreconciled but probably
irreconcilable. In addition to the confusion arising from the attempt to coordinate
section 2(5) with the proviso and the great difficulty in defining a grievance solution
of which will not be "inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining contract," a single example of this irreconcilability may suffice. The proviso states that
the bargaining representative must be given the "opportunity to be present at such
[i.e., individual or groupl adjustment [of grievances]." LMRA §9(a). If "present?'
means mere sitting in without right to participate or appeal the result, the entire
policy of the act in having a strong, exclusive bargaining agent is seriously weakened.
If "present' means more, the proviso language, that individuals or groups have the
right to adjust grievances "without intervention of the bargaining representative,"
is meaningless. It is suggested that legislative action, most likely repeal of the 9(a)
proviso, with substitution of other methods of protecting individual rights is in order.
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Plaintiff, a five-year-old child, was seriously burned when he wandered
onto a vacant lot owned by defendant and stumbled into a fire on the premises.' In an action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from
his allegedly negligent maintenance of a dangerous condition upon the land,
defendant asserted that the fire had been set by third persons without his
consent or knowledge. In reversing a verdict for plaintiff and remanding
for a new trial, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the landowner
must be shown to have had actual knowledge 2 of the existence on his land
of a condition dangerous to children when such condition had been created
by third persons, and that therefore the trial court's charge that constructive knowledge is sufficient to fix liability constituted prejudicial error.
Simnel v. New Jersey Coop Co., 143 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1958).

The duty of an owner or occupier of land toward persons entering
on the land varies according to the circumstances under which the person
enters. Generally, the landowner must use due care to maintain the premises in a safe condition for the benefit of his business invitees,3 those whom
he invites or permits to enter to conduct business dealings.4 His duty
toward social guests and mere licensees, those persons permitted to enter
solely for their own benefit, is somewhat less; he must merely warn them
of dangerous conditions of which he has knowledge.5 No such affirmative
duty is owed toward adult trespassers, the duty being limited to refraining
from negligently injuring them by active operations once their presence
1. The premises had previously been used by the city as a dump, and the fires
which injured the plaintiff consisted of burning rubbish and garbage. There is some
evidence that the fires had been in continual existence for some time. Defendant had
purchased the lot twenty-one days before the accident for use as a plant site. Although
construction had begun on the plant, there is some indication that the fires were not
seen from the vicinity of the construction. Instant case at 523.
2. The court in the instant case would include imputed knowledge as actual
knowledge, i.e., if an agent or servant of the owner has actual knowledge of the
existence of the condition, such actual knowledge is imputed to the owner whether
or not he personally has such knowledge. Instant case at 527.
3. The Restatement of Torts uses the term "business visitor" which it defines
as "a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession
of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings beGenerally, the presence of a
tween them." RESTATEMENT, TORTS §332 (1934).
possible financial benefit to the landowner is the principal factor in determining whether
the person entering is a business invitee. 2 HARPER & JAmFs, TORTS § 27.8 (1956) ;
PROSSER, TORTS 453 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §332, comment b (1934).
4. On the duty owed business invitees, see generally PaossER, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 459. This duty is considered the price the landowner must pay for the
economic benefit he derives from the presence of the visitor. In the alternative,
it is said that the landowner made an implied representation that reasonable care had
been exercised in making the place safe for such invitees. Id. at 453-55.
5. Id. at 77. There is still some authority that there is no duty owed licensees
except to refrain from inflicting intentional harm.
TORTS 783 n.1 (1952).
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has been discovered.0 Originally, no distinction was drawn between adult
and infant trespassers; both entered the premises at their peril.7 In 1873,
however, the United States Supreme Court, in Railroad Co. v. Stout,8

held that the likelihood of the presence of children, coupled with the likelihood of harm coming to them from dangerous conditions on the premises,
gave rise to a land occupier's duty to use care to prevent such harm. Dissatisfaction with this ruling led some states to refuse to make an exception
in favor of children to the general no-duty-to-trespassers rule.9 Others
required that the infant be lured onto defendant's property by the injuryproducing condition without appreciation of the danger.' 0 The vast majority of jurisdictions," however, have adopted the Stout position, substantially as formulated in the Restatement of Torts.'2 Under that formulation, the infant trespasser 13 may recover if four conditions are met:
(1) the landowner must have actual or constructive knowledge of the
existence on his land of a condition dangerous to children; 14 (2) it must
appear probable that children will be exposed to the condition; (3) the
danger must be such that children are not likely to appreciate and avoid
it;' ' and (4) the utility of the condition must be slight when balanced
6. 2 HARPER & Jwmss, op. cit. supra note 3, § 27.3; PRossER, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 76.
7. James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63
YALE L.J. 144, 161 (1953).
8. 84 U.S. 657 (1873).
9. Daniels v. New York & N.E.R.Rh, 154 Mass. 349, 28 N.E. 283 (1891) (turntable); Friedman v. Snare & Triest Co., 71 N.J.L. 605, 61 Ati. 401 (Ct. Err. & App.
1905) (falling girder); Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068
(1895) (turntable). Several states still retain the no-duty rule. See cases cited
PROSSER, op. cit. subra note 3, at 439.
10. United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1921) (abandoned cellar);
Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27 Pac. 666 (1891) (turntable). This
theory, known as the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, enabled the courts to consider the
child as an invitee. The theory is also referred to as "turntable", "attractive agencies",
"attractive instrumentalities" or "torpedo" doctrine. See cases collected in Annots.,
36 A.L.R. 982 (1925), 39 A.L.R. 486 (1925), 45 A.L.R. 982 (1926), 53 A.L.R. 1344
(1928), 60 A.L.R. 1444 (1929). Many states which followed the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine have since dropped the requirement that the child be "invited" onto the land
by the dangerous condition and have returned to an acceptance of the Stout theory.
James, supra note 7, at 164.
11. 2 HARPER & JAES, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1450; PRossER, op. cit. supra note
3, at 440.
12. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 339 (1934).

13. Apparently there is no definite rule as to the age at which the rule ceases
to apply. Recovery is seldom allowed where the child is over twelve. PRossER,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 444.
14. The condition must be a structure or some other artificial condition. RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 339 (1934). But see PRossER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 443,
where it is said that when this limitation is used it simply means that the existence
of a recognizable and unreasonable risk of harm is required.
15. Liability is denied when the condition is such that children may be expected
to appreciate the risk. Among the cases in which recovery has been denied are:
Giddings v. Superior Oil Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 607, 235 P.2d 843 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951) (moving machinery); Erickson v. Great No. Ry., 82 Minn. 60, 84 N.W.462
(1900) (fire); Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Powers, 206 Okla. 322, 243 P2d 688
(1952) (body of water).
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with the probability of harm,'0 which is to say that there must be a reasonable means available to the landowner of relieving the dangerous con17
dition.
The Stout rule grew out of the realization that in a crowded, industrialized society a higher responsibility must be required of the landowner
than that of the no-duty rule which was based on the needs and experiences of a rural, agricultural economy.' 8 The modern community must
protect its children as well as its industry. In imposing the requirement
of actual knowledge, the instant court appears concerned at the possibility
of imposing on the landowner what it considers unwarranted liability.
Ostensibly, the reason for the court's decision was a reluctance to make
the landowner the insurer of the infant by imposing on him a duty to
discover any dangerous conditions which may have been created without
his knowledge.19 The Restatement, however, imposes no duty of periodic
inspection unless under all the circumstances such inspection would be
reasonable.2 0 Thus, while the owner of a few acres of timberland in
Wyoming may be under no duty ever to inspect his land,2 1 inspection
might be required of the owner of a shed located next to a grade school
and used for the storage of fireworks. A further, although unarticulated,
reason for the court's refusal to consider evidence of defendant's constructive, as opposed to actual, knowledge as sufficient to permit plaintiff's case
to get to the jury may be a desire to retain more control over the jury
22
than it felt was possible if only constructive knowledge need be shown.
Whether such additional control is necessary is questionable. The courts
retain power to direct verdicts under the Restatement rule whenever plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proof. Whether the rule imposed by the
instant court will actually affect the results of many cases, however, is
doubtful. Supposedly, plaintiff's burden of proof has been increased. But
the number of cases in which there is no proof of actual knowledge would
seem to be very small. The chances of neither a landowner nor his agents
16. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902).
also Cahill v. E. B. & A. L. Stone Co., 153 Cal. 571, 96 Pac. 84 (1908).

See

17. This formulation does away with the old immunities designed to protect the
landowner, permitting instead a straight negligence approach to the problem of land

ownership and infant trespass.
18. See 2 HARPER & JAMrES, op. cit. opra note 3, at 1450; Green, Landowners'
Responsibility to Children, 27 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1948).
19. Instant case at 526.
20. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934). For differing views on the landowner's
duty to inspect, compare 2 HARPER & JAMEs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1459, with
PRossan, op. cit. supra note 3, at 445.

21. Cf. Puckett v. City of Louisville, 273 Ky. 349, 116 S.W.2d 627 (1938); Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Beers, 185 Okla. 331, 91 P.2d 777 (1938).
22. Courts which still cling to the no-duty rule claim that the new doctrine "gives
the jury a free hand to express its feelings for the child out of the defendant's pocket."
PRossEm, op. cit. mtpra note 3, at 439.
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or servants 23 having had the opportunity to see the danger would seem
slight. In addition, in many cases actual knowledge can be inferred from
evidence which would be used to show constructive knowledge.24 Thus,
practically speaking, plaintiff's burden of proof may have increased but
little by the action of the instant court. In the instant case, of course,
the result was changed, at least temporarily. Under the particular facts
of that case, adoption of the rule may have accomplished a desirable result
in that it made possible a new trial for a defendant whose negligence seems
somewhat questionable. 25 As applied to cases in which there is a strong
possibility of injury to trespassing children from dangerous conditions
which might reasonably be anticipated, however, the requirement of actual
knowledge, if of any effect, seems likely to operate only to free defendants
guilty of fault from liability for injuries sustained by innocent plaintiffs.
If such is its effect, in these cases at least, the Restatement rule is
preferable.
23. See note 2 supra.
24. See 2 WicimoR, Ev-mm-cE §§ 245, 252 (3d ed. 1940).

25. See note 1 supra.

